This article focuses on the electoral strategies adopted by the dominant national political parties in anticipation of the 2004 general election. The success of these strategies is apt to depend on the results of various state legislative assembly elections. We conclude with observations on recent realignments in India's foreign policy, particularly with respect to China and Pakistan.
State-Level Deterioration of the Bharatiya Janata Party
The year 2002 culminated with the cathartic victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the state assembly elections in Gujarat. The victory of the BJP in this state was remarkable, since earlier in the year Gujarat had been the site of some of the most egregious instances of anti-Muslim violence in India since Independence. Many observers of the Gujarat polls in 2002 feared that the BJP's decision to wage an electoral campaign exploiting the most aggressive aspects of Hindu chauvinism could spill over into subsequent subnational electoral contests. Moreover, in light of a strong anti-incumbent mood, the February 26, 2003, state assembly elections in Himachal Pradesh tested the solidarity of the BJP at the regional level.
With his party's regional political support crumbling and general elections looming in 2004, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee decided, for the 10th time since 1999, to reshuffle his cabinet. The January 29, 2003, reshuffle witnessed the return of Arun Jaitley, the former Union Law minister and arguably one of the most capable members of Vajpayee's cabinet. This time around, he was selected to occupy the same post that he held before his dismissal from the cabinet last year.
The return of Arun Jaitley to the NDA cabinet could have important implications for the BJP's electoral tactics in state assembly elections. After his ouster, Jaitley was granted the unenviable task of being the chief spokesperson and general secretary for controversial Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi. While Narendra Modi campaigned in the state, making frequent use of incendiary communal rhetoric, Jaitley pragmatically set out to mobilize the BJP's party machinery in order to get likely voters to the polls. The BJP's ability to mobilize party members on a selective basis, rather than crudely exploiting chauvinistic fervor among its most likely voters, may have been one of the reasons why the BJP has been able to stay afloat in Gujarat.
Attempting to replicate the success of Gujarat, concerted efforts were made to mobilize the BJP's party machinery in the state of Himachal Pradesh. In the previous state assembly election in 1998, the BJP and the Congress Party each won 31 seats in the 68-seat assembly. Nevertheless, the BJP was able to form a governing coalition with the Himachal Vikas Congress (HVC), which had obtained five seats. Based on these results, many analysts anticipated a hotly contested race in the state in 2003. Despite Himachal Pradesh's crumbling economy, BJP strategists believed that Himachal Pradesh Chief Minister Prem Kumar Dhumal could lead the BJP to a narrow victory by effectively mobilizing voters, thus replicating the incumbent party's success in Gujarat.
Unlike the controversy-filled fiasco in Gujarat, the state assembly election in Himachal Pradesh was a mundane, traditional campaign in which the BJP highlighted its party's paltry achievements in terms of the state's economic development, while the Congress Party opposition stressed Himachal Pradesh's endemic corruption, chronic unemployment, and dismal fiscal deterioration. Nevertheless, Himachal Pradesh has one of the lowest proportions of population living below the poverty level in India. In light of the closeness of the 1998 contest, the BJP began to grow concerned about the loyalty of its chief legislative ally, the HVC, which had cryptically signaled that it would be willing to form a coalition with the Congress Party.
Less significance was attached to the holding of state assembly elections in February in three other northeastern states: Tripura, Meghalaya, and Nagaland. Given the BJP's already weak legislative presence in these three small states, the electoral outcomes were deemed to have little significance on a national scale. For instance, Tripura is ruled by the Communist Party of India (Marxist)-led coalition, the Left Front. In the previous state assembly election held in 1998, the BJP ran in all 60 assembly constituencies, but won no seats, garnering only 5.87% of the total votes polled. Meghalaya is governed by a Congress Party and Nationalist Congress Party coalition, called the People's Forum of Meghalaya. In the 1998 state assembly election there, the BJP was able to win only three seats in the 60-member state assembly. Likewise, the BJP was electorally absent in Nagaland, a state where it has never won a single legislative seat. There, the Congress Party had a firm legislative hold, controlling 53 out of 60 seats.
The outcome of the state assembly elections in February held an unpleasant surprise for the BJP. Its trouncing in Himachal Pradesh was as spectacular as it was humiliating. Both the Congress Party and the BJP contested all 68 assembly seats. Congress won 40 seats (receiving 40.7% of the total vote) and the BJP won 16 (35.7% of the vote). Although the BJP fared well in terms of vote differential, it suffered a 15-seat loss in the assembly, nearly half of all the seats it obtained in the previous election.
Predictably, the BJP also received a trouncing in Tripura and Meghalaya. In Tripura, the Left Front won 41 seats out of the 60-seat assembly. The BJP won no seats. In Meghalaya, Congress and its ally, the National Congress Party, won 22 and 14 seats, respectively. In Meghalaya's 60-seat assembly, the BJP won only two seats, losing one seat in the wake of its already feeble performance in the 1998 state assembly election. Finally, in Nagaland's 60-seat assembly, the Congress Party and the National People's Front won 21 and 19 seats, respectively. In this state, the BJP performed better than it had in any previous state assembly election, yet won only seven seats.
Further evidence of the deteriorating condition of the BJP at the regional level came with the breakup of the BJP's already tenuous alliance in Uttar Pradesh with the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). After the 2002 state assembly in Uttar Pradesh, the BJP became a reluctant minority coalition partner to the 26 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIV, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2004 BSP, a party that largely represents dalit (literally, downtrodden, outcaste) interests. The resulting alliance led to the selection of Mayawati as chief minister of the state. Although she is only 47 years old, Mayawati has had a sordid and checkered political career and so far has been chief minister of India's largest state on three occasions. In a country not lacking in flamboyant and corrupt politicians, she has nevertheless remained a popular leader among her constituents.
The rift between the BJP and the BSP during the summer of 2003 was prompted by an investigation into Chief Minister Mayawati's relationship to two controversial construction projects, the Taj Heritage Corridor and the Taj Expressway. The Taj Heritage Corridor is a building project that aims to develop a monstrous and unsightly corridor behind the Taj Mahal, India's preeminent architectural landmark. At one point, the project's architects had proposed the building of a shopping mall and, it is said, an amusement park. The Taj Expressway is a proposed eight-lane highway linking Delhi with Agra, the site of the Taj Mahal.
In response to demands by environmentalist groups, the Supreme Court ordered the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to conduct an investigation of alleged irregularities with the Taj Heritage Corridor and the Taj Expressway. Mayawati, following the start of the CBI investigation, vociferously called for the resignation of India's Tourism and Culture Minister Jagmohan. However, her enthusiasm for calling attention to the criminal irregularities surrounding the Taj Heritage Corridor quickly attenuated, once it was alleged that she had deep financial ties to the building project. Documentation received by the Supreme Court revealed that prior to the granting of licenses to allow construction, Mayawati and several of her confederates had purchased large tracts of land along the proposed path of the Taj Expressway. Mayawati, however, denied that the land acquisition was related to any expectation of lucrative eminent-domain compensation. In August, Mayawati quit her post and vowed to wage a campaign against the BJP. In a Machiavellian turn, the BJP offered its support to Mulayam Singh Yadav, the leader of the Samajwadi Party, hitherto the BJP's archenemy in the state.
Preparations for the 2004 General Election
Given the BJP's dismal performance in Himachal Pradesh and elsewhere, it was widely believed that the date of the general elections in 2004 would depend on the party's performance in the November state assembly elections in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, Mizoram, and Delhi. If the BJP secured a round of electoral successes in most of these states, notably in the large Hindi-speaking states of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, then the party could interpret this as a wave of optimism for its policies and could safely INDIA IN 2003 27 call for a general election to be held as early as February 2004. Anything but an optimal performance in the state elections would prompt the BJP to hold general elections later in 2004, after the annual fiscal budget is approved in Parliament. Like other federal systems in developing countries, it has become a tradition in India to festoon the central government's budget with populist fiscal measures before an election.
In a meeting of BJP state party presidents held on May 31, 2003, in Hyderabad, the BJP formally outlined its electoral strategy for the remaining 2003 state assembly elections and the general election in 2004. Among the party's various formal strategies in states holding state assembly elections, the leadership favored mobilization of state-level party workers, bringing out a "charge sheet" (police report) in states where the BJP is in opposition, and the holding of statewide rath yatras (Hindu-style processions). 1 At the national level, the issue of the BJP's leadership in the next election and its longterm continuity in light of Vajpayee's failing health were the centerpiece of discussion.
The health issue forced the BJP to again face the possibility that it may not be able to position Vajpayee as its national candidate for prime minister. Although Deputy Prime Minister L. K. Advani is more vigorous than Vajpayee, he is a far more controversial figure among India's minority voters. Thus, in order to win the 2004 general election with an absolute majority, the BJP needs to appeal to moderate voters and to ethnic minorities, but it also needs to mobilize its more determined radical voters without antagonizing its current coalition allies in the governing NDA.
Given this conundrum, BJP party president M. Venkaiah Naidu declared that Vajpayee and Advani represented two sides of the same BJP coin. He declared that the BJP was led by a vikas purush (development man) and a loh purush (iron man). As the BJP aims to soften its image in preparation for the 2004 election, Naidu's implication was that the hardline ideology that Advani represents would also form part of the BJP plank during the general election. However, in trying to sidestep concerns about leadership continuity (and the inherent changes that would follow from the ideological differences between the two leaders), Naidu unintentionally muddled the issue with his characterization. Vajpayee himself contributed to the confusion when he suggested that the party should march to victory in the 2004 general election under the leadership of Advani. In order to provide a unified front, Naidu categorically declared that Vajpayee would be the BJP's candidate for the prime ministership.
For its part, the Congress Party faced a different set of challenges. With Sonia Gandhi as the unrivaled national party candidate, the Congress Party has not had the leadership struggles that have bedeviled the BJP. Instead, its Achilles' heel is both the lack of a credible candidate for prime minister and the absence of a coherent ideological vision. During the Congress Party's election strategy conclave in Srinagar, the leadership decided that the party should use its pro-poor policies as an election slogan. Lacking any ideological clarity, the Congress Party national leadership instead resorted to questioning the capacity for governance of the NDA coalition. In order to highlight this theme, Gandhi, the Congress Party president, called in August for debate on a no-confidence motion against the NDA government. During the legislative debates, Gandhi presented a mock police report in which she claimed that the NDA government was mired in corruption and had threatened India's national security.
Although Sonia Gandhi is habitually tepid and languorous in her public presentations, she impressed some Congress Party leaders with what they perceived to be dynamic rhetorical attacks against the NDA government. However, the no-confidence motion was swiftly defeated by 312-186, clearly showing that parliamentary support for the NDA coalition is stronger than Gandhi had anticipated. Without offering any positive assessment of how a Congress Party administration would improve governance in India, it is unlikely that voters would be inspired to vote for Sonia Gandhi's party in the forthcoming general election.
Due to its vapid national leadership, the Congress Party has repeatedly failed to capitalize on the regional weakness of the BJP. For this reason, the state assembly elections in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan also became an unintentional test case of Congress's viability at the national level. Along with nearly a majority of Indian states, both Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan are governed by the Congress Party. However, in the previous general election, voters in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan voted in favor of the BJP for federal office. Caste has provided an important idiom for many sections of the voting population to organize politically, although almost always within the context of formal party relations. Thus, it appears that many voters split their vote, voting for the Congress Party (or for a non-BJP alternative, often on the basis of caste) for state assembly elections and for the BJP or its allies at the national level.
Congress-ruled Madhya Pradesh is arguably one of the best-governed states in India. For instance, in a sea of chronic subnational fiscal mismanagement, Madhya Pradesh is one of the few states with a fiscal surplus. Chief Minister Digvijay Singh's mixture of innovative development projects at the rural level, combined with ruthless administrative downsizing, has gar- INDIA IN 2003 29 nered a lot of positive attention internationally. 2 However, the state has one of the lowest levels of per capita spending on health care in India. Moreover, inevitable accusations of endemic corruption have hampered Singh's ability to highlight his state government's achievements.
In Rajasthan, the situation of the Congress Party was quite similar. Since winning a comfortable margin of victory in the 1998 state assembly election, Congress Party Chief Minister Ashok Gehlot had been able to focus on developmental projects, including road construction and drought relief efforts. He also proposed a quota in state government jobs and reservation in university seats for economically disadvantaged upper-caste individuals.
It was clear to the BJP that Digvijay Singh was unlikely to be unseated with a campaign that called into question his state government's developmental achievements. In a brilliant stroke of pre-electoral strategy, Digvijay Singh also attempted to co-opt the BJP from exploiting salient Hindutva issues. 3 For instance, Singh proposed a ban on cow slaughter. He also proposed a change of his government's policy regarding the Bhojshala, a religious center at Dhar where the Kamal Maulana mosque shares space with a Hindu shrine. Although the religious site had been the location of clashes between the police and Hindu fundamentalists, Singh proposed that restrictions on Hindu visitors to the site should be relaxed. On an equally sensitive issue, Singh mirrored the BJP's own official stand when he advocated that a Ram temple should be built at Ayodhya.
Following Digvijay Singh's strategy, Ashok Gehlot attempted to undermine the BJP's possible use of communal polarization as a method of mobilizing voters in Rajasthan. Like Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan has a small Muslim presence and has avoided some of the communal strife that has plagued other Hindi-belt states. Taking into account the implicit significance of caste in voting patterns, both the Congress Party and the BJP made shrewd electoral calculations, linking a candidate's caste background to match the predominant caste composition in a given electoral constituency. In contrast to Digvijay Singh's soft accommodation to Hindutva issues, Ashok Gehlot decided not to oblige Hindu chauvinists in his state. He banned the distribution of trishuls (tridents) by the Hindu chauvinist association, the Vishwa 3. Hindutva is an abstract term commonly used in Indian political discourse to refer to the ideology of Hindu nationalism. Advocates of Hindutva argue that it is a secular political manifestation on behalf of the protection of certain Hindu rituals and symbols. Opponents of Hindutva view it as an expression that denotes intolerant and chauvinistic Hinduism.
Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council, VHP). 4 He also detained prominent VHP leaders to prevent them from holding rallies and rath yatras in Rajasthan.
The BJP revealed its electoral strategy in Madhya Pradesh by naming Uma Bharati, a strident Hindu chauvinist ideologue, as its campaign leader in the state. In the NDA government, Uma Bharati occupies the post of union minister of state for sports, welfare, and youth affairs. However, she is best known for her participation in the spreading of communal fervor that led to the demolition of the Babri Masjid (mosque) at Ayodhya in 1991. Curiously, although Uma Bharati has often been keen to exploit Hindu chauvinist sentiments, she claimed that her electoral campaign in Madhya Pradesh would focus on the state's widespread corruption. Her decision may have been prompted by pragmatism rather than ideology, as she had already angered many members of Hindu chauvinist groups such as the VHP and the Rasthtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). This rift occurred because in the process of launching a rath yatra procession, Uma Bharati had offered a birthday cake to the Hindu god Hanuman at the Hanuman temple in Chhindwara. Members of the VHP and the RSS, among others, believed that the act desecrated the temple because women are barred from entry there. Moreover, allegations that the birthday cake contained eggs-a polluting substance in Hindu rituals-further diminished her image among RSS activists.
A month before the state assembly election, Uma Bharati's actual participation in the poll was under question, as she had not yet filed her nomination papers declaring which constituency she was going to contest. This uncertainty caused some panic within BJP ranks, as Uma Bharati had once declined to participate in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, citing an unspecified severe illness.
The run-up to the state assembly election in Rajasthan also did not lack in drama. The BJP selected Vasundhara Raje Scindia as its chief ministerial candidate. Raje, a charismatic politician of princely lineage, attempted to position herself as an approachable candidate, humbly referring to herself as the people's princess. The choice of a celebrity, although one with some political experience at the federal level as a member of parliament, was a risky one for the BJP's national leadership. They feared that her unorthodox campaigning style would weaken the BJP's image in the state.
Overall, the state legislative assembly elections in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan became a test of electoral strategies. With the exception of Delhi, the results from the November state assembly elections proved to be a success for the BJP. In Madhya Pradesh, the BJP captured 173 seats in a 230-seat assembly, increasing its presence there by 51 members since the previous election. The Congress Party only mustered 38 seats, an astonishing loss of 134 seats from the 1998 election. The BJP also captured control of the state assembly of Chhattisgarh, the tribal-dominated state that before its secession from Madhya Pradesh was a bastion of Congress Party political control. Although pre-election polls predicted a close victory by the Congress Party in Rajasthan, the BJP also pummeled its way to victory. The BJP in- 
New Directions in Foreign Policy?
Unlike its domestic policy, the NDA coalition has been responsible for a renewed dynamism in foreign policy issues. During the Janata Party's interlude The swiftness with which the Declaration was signed appeared to work to China's benefit. The Declaration contained an intriguingly worded statement in relation to sensitive border issues, including India's stand on Tibet and China's stand on the annexation of Sikkim, an Indian state along the Chinese border. In what appeared to be a subtle departure from India's posture on the question of Tibet, India explicitly recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region as being part of the territory of China. Moreover, in the Declaration, India reiterated that it would not allow Tibetans living in India to engage in antiChinese political activities.
However, New Delhi failed to receive reciprocal Chinese recognition of India's 1975 annexation of Sikkim. In the Declaration, China fell short of outright recognition of Sikkim as being a part of India; in fact, it did not mention the state by name. Instead, the Declaration stated both sides would work together to "maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas" and to seek a mutually acceptable solution through bilateral consultation. Both sides also agreed to implement existing agreements on border issues, including those that provided "clarification of the Line of Actual Control." 5 From New Delhi's perspective, the most important element of the Joint Declaration was the prospect for growing economic cooperation between India and China. Like many of its neighbors, India has failed to replicate China's spectacular export-led economic growth and its ability to attract foreign direct investment. In light of this asymmetrical regional competition, New Delhi positioned itself as a potential destination for China's rapidly expanding corporations. In return, Indian exports could have greater access to China's markets. In order to increase bilateral complementarities on this front, the Joint Declaration called for a Joint Study Group to recommend potential areas of economic cooperation. In addition to setting a target of $10 billion in bilateral trade by 2005, India and China pledged to increase their cooperation on World Trade Organization (WTO) issues.
Although the NDA had pledged to help build a system of trade and economic cooperation through an expanded global system of trade preferences among developing nations, until recently New Delhi had not taken a very active role in pursuing this goal. However, partly as a result of China and
